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    1 
Introduction 
For hundreds of years the city of Rome and its inhabitants fought with their neighbors 
and expanded their territory until they established a vast empire which encompassed much of 
modern day Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. As Roman territory grew, conquest 
continued to fuel further conquest, but this was not a pattern that could continue indefinitely. 
Eventually new conquests simply became unprofitable, as can be seen from the Emperor 
Trajan’s conquest of Dacia which failed even to pay the expenses of the expedition.1 This led to 
the Roman Empire becoming largely stagnant by the mid-third century and both exterior and 
interior pressures combined to pull the empire apart, culminating in 476 C.E. with the final 
collapse of the Western Roman Empire. 
 Numerous scholars have sought to explain the collapse of this once great empire. Edward 
Gibbon, who published six volumes on The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire during the 
final quarter of the 18th century, was one of the earliest scholars to advocate for a primary 
catalyst behind the Western Roman collapse. While Gibbon covered at least two dozen factors 
which contributed to the ultimate collapse, his chapters on Christianity portrayed his true 
feelings. Gibbon’s arguments in these sections can be accurately summarized as “the insensible 
penetration of Christianity in the empire fatally undermined the genius of a great people.”2 The 
problem with this conclusion is two-fold. First of all, this explanation is too narrow as it is 
difficult to believe one single factor brought down the empire. More importantly, it is clear that 
                                                            
1 Tainter, Joseph A., The Collapse of Complex Societies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),   129. 
2 Jordan, David P. Gibbon and his Roman Empire. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1971), 213. 
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the Eastern Roman Empire was by far more Christian than the West, therefore if Christianity was 
behind the fall, the East should have fallen first. 
 The argument for lead poisoning fatally weakening the empire provides another example 
of scholars searching to explain the fall of the Western Empire with one factor above all others. 
Jerome Nriagu argues that “the one incontestable historical fact about the Roman aristocracy is 
that its ranks declined quite rapidly during the last century of the Republic and during the early 
centuries of the Empire.”3 In Nriagu’s mind, lead poisoning led to “aristothanasia” and 
furthermore “one would expect the progeny of great men to be mainly imbeciles and 
underachievers.”4 This conclusion is the product of both false conclusions and a lack of 
understanding of lead poisoning symptoms. Sufficient evidence is not available to support a 
significant decline in the aristocracy and even if this decline took place, numerous other factors 
such as war or plague could just as easily be held up as explanations. More importantly, the 
author tends to count any description of bellyache or other abdominal symptoms as lead 
poisoning. Many modern scholars believe true cases of ancient lead poisoning are not difficult to 
identify and the descriptions used by Nriagu from the Hippocratic corpus and from the Sanskrit 
Susruta almost certainly are not true cases of lead poisoning.5 While evidence indicates that lead 
poisoning did occur in antiquity, it did so on an infrequent basis and certainly did not bring down 
the Roman Empire. 
 Numerous recent scholars hold more conventional explanations for the fall of the empire. 
Louis West argued that “in a word, the poor and the army had eaten up the capital of the thrifty 
                                                            
3 Nriagu, Jerome O. Lead and Lead Poisoning in Antiquity. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), 407. 
4 Nriagu, 411. 
5 Waldron, H. A. Review of Lead and Lead Poisoning in Antiquity by Jerome O. Nriagu. Isis 76, no. 1 (Mar 1985), 
119. 
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and the western half of Europe sank into the dark ages.”6 A.H.M. Jones was on a similar path 
when he argued “the evidence does suggest that over taxation played a significant role in the 
decline of the empire.” Jones further argues that this over taxation led to the progressive 
abandonment of lands and in turn the impoverishment of the empire.7 On the other hand, Arther 
Ferrill’s work stressed that “strictly military considerations must play a large part in any 
explanation of the fall of the Roman Empire.”8 Each of these explanations contains the flaw of 
resorting to a single catalyst to examine above all others. While this serves to stress one key area 
and is good for a work with a narrow focus, this approach often leads to key information being 
omitted and ignored. Only by examining a wide range of economic and military factors can one 
find a more complete picture of the fall of the Western Roman Empire. 
 The purpose of this study is to examine a wide range of economic and military factors 
from the Third-Century Crisis to the fall of the Western Empire. My investigation of the Roman 
Economy focuses on taxation, inflation, coinage, mining, slavery and coloni. In the section on 
the Roman Army, I address policy decisions of emperors, logistics, pay and supply of the armies, 
military losses and recruitment, strategies and tactics, and the overall decline in population 
across the empire. By taking this broad approach and examining numerous factors, I will present 
a more complete explanation for the decline and eventual collapse of the Western Roman 
Empire. This explanation will show how the slow erosion of both the Roman economy and 
military from the third-century onward fatally weakened the Western Roman Empire causing it 
to fall apart.  
The Roman Army 
                                                            
6 West, Louis C. “The Economic Collapse of the Roman Empire.” The Classical Journal 28, no. 2 (Nov 1932), 106. 
7 Jones, A. H. M. The Roman Economy. Edited by P. A. Brunt. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 88. 
8 Ferrill, Arther. The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1986), 7. 
4 
 
 
The Roman military was the very life force which held the empire together. Without a 
strong army, the Romans could never have created their vast empire. From the mid-third century 
onward, this vital component to the success and stability of the empire slowly withered away. 
Poor imperial strategy combined with the declining quality of the soldiery opened the empire to 
increasing barbarian attacks. Over time, these attacks simply overwhelmed the remaining Roman 
military forces. 
Third-Century Crisis 
Following the murder of Emperor Severus Alexander in 235, the Roman Empire plunged 
into a near fifty year period of chaos know as the Third-Century Crisis.9 This bleak time in 
Roman history found the empire engaged in a never-ending series of foreign and civil wars 
which led to widespread destruction within many of the provinces. During this period, there were 
27 recognized emperors and numerous other claimants to the throne.10 Several key external 
factors made the threat of outside invasion greater than ever. The first of these was the gradual 
development of many smaller Germanic tribes into larger and more closely-knit groups. From 
this reorganization groups such as the Franks, Saxons, Goths and Alemanni developed. This is 
not to imply these groups functioned internally like anything that would resemble a state or 
nation, but what it did mean was that these groups could mobilize men for war on a previously 
unheard of scale. The second key development occurred in the east with the rise of the Sassanid 
Persian Empire. This new ruling class galvanized the Persian Empire into a military power which 
could rival Rome for control of the east. The Persians relied on heavily armored shock cavalry 
                                                            
9 Penrose, Jane, ed. Rome and Her Enemies: An Empire Created and Destroyed by War. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing 
Ltd., 2005), 173. 
10 Tainter, 137. 
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and had increased siege capabilities. This allowed the Persian Emperor Shapur I, who came to 
power in 241, to attack deep into Roman territory going so far as to temporarily capture 
Antioch.11
The practice of emperors personally leading their troops into battle during much of this 
period was disastrous for the stability of the empire. An early example of this comes from the 
short-lived Emperor Maximinus who ruled from 235 through 238. Maximinus attempted to play 
up his personal bravery to both the people and senate in Rome by fighting against Germanic 
tribes in 235. His attempt at incurring their favor failed and he was murdered in 238 during a 
revolt within his army.12 At least Maximinus managed not to die in battle. In 251, Emperor 
Decius and much of his army died fighting against the Goths.13 In 259, Emperor Valerian 
suffered an even worse fate when Persian forces surrounded and captured both him and his army 
at Edessa.14
These crushing defeats and continued instability throughout the empire led to the 
development of new tactics for fending off barbarian invaders. After 260, senators ceased to 
command legions. Equestrian prefects replaced them and this was a key move away from 
amateur leadership towards a more professional military elite. The infantry continued to fight 
much as it always had, with throwing spears and short stabbing swords, but the new change for 
the army was a much greater reliance upon cavalry.15 Large numbers of cavalry units were of the 
                                                            
11 Williams, Stephen. Diocletian: And the Roman Recovery. (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1985), 15-7. 
12 Herodian, 7.2. Quoted in The Roman Army, 31 BC- AD 337: A Sourcebook, Edited by Brian Campbell, 234. 
(London: Routledge Publishing, 1994), 234. 
13 Kulikowski, Michael. Rome’s Gothic Wars: From the Third Century to Alaric. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 18. 
14 Williams, 21. 
15 Campbell, Brian. “The Army,” in The Cambridge Ancient History: The Crisis of Empire, A.D. 193-337, Edited by 
Alan K. Bowman, Peter Garnsey, and Averil Cameron,  2nd ed. Vol. 12, 110-130. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 111-117. 
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utmost importance especially under the system of “elastic defense” developed in the late 250s 
and utilized by Emperors Gallienus, Claudius, and Aurelian. Under this system, fixed frontier 
lines disappeared in favor of meeting invaders within Roman territory. The mobility of the 
cavalry, as they were able to travel up to 50 miles a day on good roads, was essential in meeting 
and dealing with these threats. The drawback of this tactic was that invaders could cause 
significant amounts of damage to the provinces before they were finally defeated, as the 
Alemanni did during one such incursion in 258 before they were finally defeated at Milan.16 
Emperor Gallienus may well have been the first to establish independent cavalry regiments 
making this defensive system more manageable.17  
Throughout this period, a trend developed where large numbers of auxiliary troops served 
to help the regular army deal with threats. By 235, at least 400 of these units served the empire 
and they played a significant role in defending against these near constant invasions.18 These 
auxiliary units would have strongly supplemented the 33 legions known to have existed in 235.19 
In spite of these additional military units, it does not appear that adequate troops were always 
available to deal with barbarian incursions even in the heart of provinces. This was especially 
true if large incursions occurred on multiple fronts at the same time. The collapse of the frontier 
between the Rhine and the Danube by the year 260 took place during a time of massive pressure 
in the east, as Persian Emperor Shapur captured Antioch in 256.20 An additional series of raids 
by Germanic peoples into Gaul in the 270s led to the sacking of nearly 60 towns, including Paris. 
As the military was unable to provide adequate protection, many of these towns took the 
                                                            
16 Williams, 92‐3. 
17 Campbell, 115. 
18 Campbell, 111. 
19 Tainter, 136. 
20 Luttwak, Edward N., The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 152. 
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initiative to erect strong walls to prevent future disasters.21 An inscription from Dacia dated to 
248 indicates widespread fortification projects began early during this period. The inscription 
states that “in order to protect the community of their own colony of Romula, they built the 
circuit of the walls from the base up by means of a body of soldiers.”22 Around 271, Emperor 
Aurelian constructed a wall around the city of Rome.23 This indicates that the army was no 
longer capable of adequately protecting the general population against foreign threats.  
While the Roman military was badly battered during this period of crisis, it still retained 
its ability to win substantial victories and this allowed the army, and the empire, to survive 
through the Third-Century Crisis.24 In 268, Emperor Claudius II appears to have won a smashing 
victory over the Goths. While the claim by the likely fictitious Trebellius Pollio that the emperor 
killed 320,000 Goths and destroyed 2,000 of their ships is clearly exaggerated, it seems 
reasonable to assume this is a defeat which the Goths would have felt for some time to come.25 
In 271, Emperor Aurelian appears to have further punished the Goths by invading and defeating 
them on their own territory, even though he decided to abandon the province of Dacia as being 
indefensible.26 Victories such as these would have made barbarians think twice before they 
invaded the Roman Empire. Through his numerous successes, Emperor Aurelian was able to 
push back many of the barbarians and retake a number of provinces which had been previously 
lost, which restored at least some stability throughout the empire.27
                                                            
21 Williams, 93. 
22  ILS 510. Quoted  in The Roman Army, 31 BC- AD 337: A Sourcebook, Edited by Brian Campbell,  (London: 
Routledge Publishing, 1994), 124-5. 
23 Boak, Arthur E. R. Manpower Shortage and the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West. (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1955), 25. 
24 Campbell, 111. 
25S.H.A. The Deified Claudius, VIII.  
26 Kulikowski, 20. 
27 Tainter, 140. 
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Recruitment during this period is difficult to quantify, but some sources indicate the use 
of barbarians in the army, especially in the case of barbarians previously settled within the 
borders of the empire. Emperor Marcus Aurelius provides an example of this when he settled the 
defeated Germanic Marcomanni tribe on Roman lands in exchange for them providing recruits 
for the army.28 Evidence of Gothic troops serving among Roman units during this period comes 
from a battle inscription created by Persian Emperor Shapur.29 After defeating invading 
Germanic tribes, Emperor Probus took 16,000 of the captives as recruits and spread them 
throughout the provinces in detachments of 50 or 60. He is quoted as stating that the aid of 
barbarian auxiliaries “must be felt but not seen.”30 The total number of barbarian auxiliaries that 
served with Roman units during this period is unknown, but it is clear that the Roman Empire 
was experiencing a shortage in new recruits. 
 The effect of the instability and destruction of the Third-Century Crisis on the general 
population could have been nothing short of devastating. This is especially true considering the 
fact that the general population may not have recovered from the severe plague which struck the 
empire from 165-180, and likely again in 189.31 J.F. Gilliam convincingly argues that this plague 
did not kill half of the population as many early historians believed, but he may have gone too 
far in the other direction by estimating that it killed only 1 to 2 percent of the population. A 7 to 
10 percent mortality rate for the empire seems more reasonable.32 Whatever the exact percentage 
was, it seems clear that this plague disrupted patterns in many archaeological data sets. These 
data sets show a considerable drop in meat consumption and a decline in the length of the 
                                                            
28 Tainter, 135. 
29 Kulikowski, 36. 
30 S.H.A. Probus, XIV. 
31 Littman R. J. and M. L. Littman. “Galen and the Antonine Plague.” The American Journal of Philology 94, no. 3 
(Autumn 1973), 243-5. 
32 Littman R. J. and M. L. Littman, 252. 
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average Roman femur, indicating a shorter and less healthy population. The argument that the 
climate of Europe at this time was cooler and dryer, if true, would only have contributed to the 
severity of the plague.33 Based on the evidence available, this plague contributed greatly to the 
overall population loss which took place during this period.  
Less than a century later during the worst portion of the Third-Century Crisis from 250 to 
270, another large-scale plague struck the Roman Empire, this one starting in the east and 
spreading quickly, likely due to the movement of soldiers. When this plague is coupled with the 
widespread barbarian raids of this era it is reasonable to assume that the peasant population 
dropped substantially. This is especially true when one factors in the scores of slaves and tenant 
farmers, many of Germanic origin, who would have taken the opportunity presented by the 
confusion and disruption of this period to flee from their lands and masters.34 It was from this 
diminished population that the army had to find enough recruits to defend the empire.35
 
 
Diocletian  
Emperor Diocletian’s relatively stable reign from 284 to 305 helped the Roman Empire 
emerge from the dark shadow of the Third-Century Crisis. Diocletian reorganized both the 
government and the frontiers in an attempt to permanently stabilize the empire. Following a 
serious revolt in Egypt in 297, Diocletian became convinced multiple rulers were needed to 
effectively run the empire. This led him to create the Tetrarchy, or rule of four, with two senior 
members known as Augusti and two junior members called Caesars. The purpose of this system 
                                                            
33 Jongman, Willem M. “Gibbon was Right: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Economy.” Roman Economic 
History as World History (2006), 192-5. 
34 Boak, 24-6. 
35 Boak, 124‐5. 
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was to allow multiple rulers to deal with multiple threats at the same time.36 In 298, the junior 
Emperor Galerius won a key victory over the Persians and made peace with them under 
extremely advantageous terms. The new established frontier was both more advanced and more 
easily defensible than the previous frontier had been. Elsewhere, the abandonment of certain 
territories made the frontiers easier to defend. In the west, the province of Dacia was recognized 
as lost and all territory beyond the Rhine-Danube line was abandoned.  In North Africa, the 
southern limes of Volubilis were evacuated, as was territory in southern Nubia. In all, the 
frontiers were simplified, with exposed salients being abandoned in favor of more easily 
defensible lines, and only in the east was new territory added, but even here this contributed to 
the overall defensibility of the frontier.37
 This reorganization of the frontiers served as an integral part of Diocletian’s new 
defense-in-depth strategy. This new strategy called for the engagement of invaders within 
Roman territory, but still very near to the borders. To ensure deep penetrations into Roman lands 
did not occur, this strategy called for hard points to be set up at the frontiers and then continuing 
back into the province. These hard points included walled towns and numerous military forts set 
up at strategic locations such as river crossings, strategic passes through rough terrain, and along 
roads.38 The hard points would be combined with mobile field forces, including a large number 
of cavalry units, organized on a regional level to respond to barbarian threats. When invaders 
crossed the frontier, the hard points served the purpose of slowing down and channeling the 
enemy penetration, and thus making barbarian invaders much easier to intercept and defeat 
                                                            
36 Tainter, 141. 
37 Luttwak, 152‐9. 
38 Luttwak, 155‐161. 
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before they could cause significant amounts of damage to the provinces.39 Several surviving 
ancient writers seem to indicate that this new strategy met with a high degree of success. 
Zosimus states that “by the forethought of Diocletian, the frontiers of the empire everywhere 
were covered, as I have stated, with cities, garrisons and fortifications which housed the whole 
army.”40 Eumenius further indicates the extensiveness of the system by commenting “who can 
count the numbers of forts of cavalry and infantry that have been rebuilt along the whole length 
of the Rhine, the Danube, and the Euphrates?”41 This defense-in-depth system appears to have 
been largely successful at holding back the barbarians. At the very least, it would have been a 
powerful psychological tool which may very well have discouraged many potential invaders 
from risking an attack on Roman territory. 
 For this strategy to be successful, the Roman army needed a vast expansion. It is 
estimated that the army stood at 400,000 strong when Diocletian came to power and by the end 
of his reign had been increased to between 500,000 and 600,000 men.42 At the very least, the 33 
legions of the Severan Era had increased to 67 legions by the end of Diocletian’s reign in 305. 
However, this massive increase in the size of the army would have led to severe recruitment 
problems. Under Diocletian, it was the responsibility of city governments or individual 
landowners to produce recruits annually. Instead of providing recruits, many landowners simply 
gave money to help encourage enlistment from barbarians either within, or outside of Roman 
territory through enlistment bonuses.43 The practice of settling barbarians within the Roman 
Empire in exchange for military service was now to become all the more common. Around 295, 
                                                            
39 Williams, 93‐4. 
40 Zosimus. New History. Translated by Ronald Ridley. (Canberra: Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, 
1982), 39. 
41 Williams, 91. 
42 Tainter,141. 
43 Campbell, 123‐6. 
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the defeated tribes the Chamavi and the Frisians received vacant lands in Gaul as part of a 
program designed to repopulate Gaul and provide a reserve of recruits for the upcoming war to 
reconquer Britain.44 In 307, the junior Emperor Galerius settled the defeated Carpi on lands 
south of the Danube as defeated subjects under the condition that they provide him with recruits 
for his army.45 An anonymous Gallic orator summed this practice up quite well in 297 when he 
wrote: 
Now the barbarian farmer produces corn… and indeed even if he is summoned 
for the levy he presents himself speedily, reduced to complete compliance and 
totally under our control, and is pleased that he is a mere slave under the name of 
military service.46
 
This system appears to have worked well at this time, which explains why it was widely used. 
The drawback to the system was that nothing guaranteed that these barbarian federates, as they 
were called, would continue to maintain their loyalty to Rome. 
 Evidence from this period suggests that Diocletian was worried about being able to 
adequately provision his armies. In the preamble of his Edict of Maximum Prices, Diocletian 
states his concern for the soldiers and the ability to supply them when he proclaimed that 
“sometimes in a single purchase a soldier is deprived of his bonus and salary, and that the 
contribution of the whole world to support our armies falls to the abominable profit of thieves.”47 
This preamble and the tables of maximum prices taken together give a strong indication that 
Diocletian’s chief concern was not as much the high cost of the necessities of life, but instead the 
high cost of supplying the armies.48 A key development initiated by Diocletian was the 
                                                            
44 Williams, 73. 
45 Kulikowski, 78. 
46 Campbell, 126. 
47 Frank, Tenney. An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome. vol. 5, Rome and Italy of the Empire. (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1940), 314. 
48 West, Louis C. “Notes on Diocletian’s Edict.” Classical Philology 34, no. 3 (July 1939), 239. 
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innovation of state run arsenals managed by army personnel and manned by skilled artisans 
conscripted for military service. Approximately twelve of these arsenals were initially 
established, with more being added by his successors. This direct state control soon spread to all 
industries considered key to the survival of the Roman Empire such as textiles, brickworks, 
mining and pottery just to name a few. State supervision over the industrial capacity of the 
empire ensured the manufacture of enough provisions to supply the army with all of its needs. 
Future emperors maintained, and some even expanded, the level of state control over 
production.49 Evidence of pay to the armies is confined to surviving Egyptian papyrus which 
requests the authorities of Panopolis to pay military units in Upper Egypt, and while this papyrus 
is difficult to interpret, it does seem to indicate that military pay was nominal compared to the 
rate of inflation. Regular donatives on the birthday and accession of ruling emperors, along with 
smaller donatives for the consulships of junior emperors would have significantly boosted the 
soldier’s income. In addition, Roman legionaries received an allowance of meat and salt, while 
auxiliaries received corn.50
 
Constantine  
Following the abdication of Diocletian and Maximian in 305, the Tetrarchy fell apart, 
largely over the choice of two of Galerius’ close supporters as Caesars instead of the sons’ of 
Galerius and Constantius who had just become Augusti. On Constantius’ death in 306, his son 
Constantine was acclaimed emperor and in 307, a series of civil wars began.51 Shortly before 
confronting the usurper Maxentius, Constantine appears to have had a dream during which he 
                                                            
49 Williams, 136. 
50 Campbell, 126‐7. 
51 Kulikowski, 80. 
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received the message from a god to use a standard in the form of a cross to protect him from his 
enemies.52 Whether or not this actually happened is debatable, but it is a fact that after his 
victory over Maxentius at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge, Constantine did convert to 
Christianity. It is difficult to say how much of an effect this conversion would have had on the 
army, but it does appear that soldiers in the army were overwhelmingly pagan at this time.53
 Constantine established powerful field armies for empire-wide service and to field these 
armies, provincial forces had to be correspondingly reduced.54 There is some indication that 
Diocletian had a field army, but it does not appear to have been critical to his overall strategy.55 
On the contrary, under Constantine and his system of concentrated mobile forces the highest 
priority was not protecting the provinces themselves, but protecting the emperor. The mobile 
army and the frontiers now fell under a separate command structure. This was very similar to the 
system used during the worst portion of the Third-Century Crisis, and while the frontiers were 
certainly not abandoned, they no longer had the manpower to resist serious enemy incursions. 
The experience Constantine had in fighting civil wars clearly influenced his decision on the 
development of this large mobile army.56 This mobile army placed a high priority on cavalry 
units which could be deployed quickly to affected regions.57  
At least one ancient writer appears to have felt that Constantine’s weakening of frontier 
defenses and creation of a mobile army was a major mistake. Speaking on the frontiers, Zosimus 
writes that: 
                                                            
52 Eusebius. Life of Constantine the Great. Edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, vol. 1, Life of Constantine the Great. (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1995), 490. 
53 Penrose, 233. 
54 Luttwak, 178. 
55 Campbell, 121. 
56 Williams, 207. 
57 Tainter, 142. 
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Constantine destroyed this security by removing most of the troops from the 
frontiers and stationing them in cities which did not need assistance, thus both 
stripping of protection those being molested by the barbarians and subjecting the 
cities left alone by them to the outrages of the soldiers, so that henceforth most 
have become deserted. Moreover he enervated the troops by allowing them to 
devote themselves to shows and luxuries. In plain terms, Constantine was the 
origin and beginning of the present destruction of the empire.58
 
While this criticism is quite harsh and shows Zosimus’ strong dislike for Constantine, he makes 
several very good points. There does appear to be a qualitative decline in soldiers during this 
period, but it is unclear if this came from a relaxed standard of recruitment or simply a general 
loss of discipline within the army.59 Estimates for the size of Constantine’s army range as high as 
650,000 men. A law issued by Constantine in 313 requiring soldiers’ sons to serve in the military 
indicates that recruitment had become a problem. Evasion of this law appears to have been 
widespread because from 319 to 398 there were twenty-two additional laws issued regarding 
attempts to evade military service.60 Recruitment of large numbers of barbarians to fill out the 
ranks would certainly have been possible, and even likely, when the difficulty in finding recruits 
for the mobile army is factored in. As this army could be stationed anywhere, many individuals 
would have avoided joining it at all costs because they did not wish to be stationed far from their 
home provinces.61 Whatever the qualitative drop may have been, it still appears that this mobile 
field army could defeat attacking enemies, but in many cases this was only done after they had 
caused much damage to the provinces. The cumulative effect of this damage may very well have 
led to the erosion of the logistical base for the empire.62
                                                            
58 Zosimus, 39. 
59 Luttwak, 179. 
60 Tainter, 141‐4. 
61 Luttwak, 179. 
62 Luttwak, 190. 
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 Constantine rewarded soldiers who fulfilled their term of service, likely twenty years, 
with significant retirement bonuses. Veterans received two options. They could receive 
unoccupied land to farm along with 25 folles in cash to buy the necessities of rural life. In 
addition to this, veterans choosing this option were to receive a pair of oxen and 100 modii of 
assorted seeds. Under the second option, veterans received the lump sum of 100 folles in cash so 
that they could go into business.63 This law shows both the incentive given to soldiers to join the 
army and serve out their full term, and it also indicates enough vacant land was available for 
them to receive upon the completion of their term of service. 
Death of Constantine through Theodosius  
Shortly after the death of Constantine in 337, the Roman Empire was once again plunged 
into civil war. In 354, Emperor Constantius II emerged victorious from this series of civil wars to 
control the Roman world. Beginning at this time the ancient historian Ammianus Marcellinus 
provides us with detailed accounts of the reigns, achievements, and abilities of Roman emperors 
through 378. Understanding how these emperors were perceived, as well as exactly what they 
accomplished, provides key insights into just how capable they were at maintaining stability 
throughout the empire. First, we hear from Ammianus of the cruelty of the Constantius II’s co-
emperor Gallus. During his reign, “a number of people were found guilty and condemned 
through mere misty suspicion.”64 Some of these people were killed, while others had their 
property confiscated, and still others were exiled penniless. Constantius executed Gallus after a 
reign of only four years. Following this Constantius promoted his only remaining relative, Julian 
as his new co-emperor.65 With this we can see that Gallus was not running his portion of the 
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empire up to the standard which was expected of him. It is also clear that instead of helping him 
or persuading him to change his ways, Constantius simply found it more expedient to have him 
removed. While Gallus may very well have been killed because of his excess cruelty, the same 
exact charge is leveled at Constantius by Ammianus who states “Constantius’ narrow and 
sensitive mind treated the slightest rumor as evidence of an actual or projected attempt on his 
life, and made his victory an occasion of mourning by the slaughter of the innocent.”66 It would 
appear that neither Gallus nor Constantius would have enjoyed a high level of support among the 
population. 
 Following the death of Gallus, Julian proceeded to administer the western portion of the 
empire quite skillfully. He managed to reconquer Cologne and the area around it which 
Ammianus describes as being virtually deserted of fortifications, thus illustrating the lack of 
attention that had been paid to this portion of the frontier.67 The situation changed early in 360, 
when Constantius demanded that Julian send a portion of his army east to fight against the 
Persians. While Julian was attempting to arrange this, his soldiers mutinied and proclaimed 
Julian to be emperor, thus once again illustrating the difficulty in forcing troops from one region 
of the empire to move to another. Also seen from this is a strong sense of loyalty displayed by 
the troops that Julian had personally led to victories in battle.68 Before another full-scale civil 
war began, Constantius died of natural causes leaving Julian sole emperor. On his accession, 
Ammianus tells us that people beyond the Tigris and the Armenians sued for peace, and that 
Indian peoples competed to send him gifts. The Moors offered him their services and previously 
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unknown tribes from the Black Sea region offered to pay him tribute to be left in peace.69 While 
this is likely an exaggeration, it still shows the level of respect that a proven emperor with a 
record of military victories could obtain. The downside to being an emperor who led troops in 
battle is that this is a hazardous way to rule as Julian found out in 363 while campaigning against 
the Persians. During a skirmish, Julian received a wound from a cavalry spear and died shortly 
thereafter.70 The army then elected a man named Jovian as emperor who concluded a disastrous 
peace agreement with the Persians, surrendering huge amounts of territory even though 
Ammianus states, “the Romans had the upper hand in almost all the fighting.” Jovian then died 
before he could even make it back to the heart of the empire.71 This clearly illustrates how the 
untimely death of an emperor, especially in combat, could have disastrous consequences for the 
empire. 
The Roman military elite made Valentinian the next emperor and despite advice to the 
contrary, he appointed his brother Valens as co-emperor.72 Valentinian was the last Roman 
Emperor who systematically patrolled and fortified the western frontiers and he ran his portion of 
the empire with both skill and vigor.73 Ammianus described Valentinian’s belief that it was “a 
greater service to keep the barbarians in check by frontier barriers than to defeat them in 
battle.”74 Following the formal division of the empire made by Valentinian and Valens in 364, 
the two portions increasingly governed and regulated their own affairs without consulting each 
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other.75 Even though Valens was ruling primarily on his own, throughout much of his reign he 
managed to keep his portion of the empire largely intact. This was of course until he made the 
fateful decision to give battle against the Goths at Adrianople, even though the western emperor 
Gratian was fast approaching with an army to support him in crushing these invaders. This 
decision cost him both his army and his life.76
With the accession of Emperor Theodosius in 379, the role of the emperor began to 
change. No longer did the emperor directly lead troops into battle or reside in frontier regions. 
Theodosius spent much of his reign in Constantinople, leaving for extended periods only to 
suppress the usurpations of Maximus and Eugenius.77 Theodosius’ lack of involvement in 
campaigns and on the battlefield would not have allowed him to develop the loyalty of his 
soldiers as Julian had done before him. On the other hand, it also ensured that he would not die 
in battle. With his death in 395, Theodosius left the empire to his two young and inexperienced 
sons Honorius and Arcadius. This lack of experienced leadership gave rise to a power vacuum of 
which powerful generals took full advantage, especially in the west.78 With the death of 
Theodosius came the final division of the Roman Empire between east and west. After 
Theodosius, no single emperor was able to reunite the two portions of the empire ever again. As 
we shall see, this was extremely bad for the western portion of the empire which was 
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economically inferior and was strategically more vulnerable due to the vast length of the 
frontiers which had to be protected.79
We know more about the fighting abilities and styles of Rome’s primary enemies during 
this period than in virtually any other era during the late Roman Empire. In a victory over the 
Alamanni by Constantius, Ammianus states the defeated barbarians threw away their armor to 
run faster, and thus gives a rare mention of Germanic peoples wearing armor.80 In a separate 
engagement with these same barbarians won by Julian, Ammianus states the Alamanni held the 
advantage in both strength and height giving a key glimpse into the physical stature likely shared 
by many Germanic tribes.81 In a description of Persian troops, Ammianus tells us that their 
military training and discipline, combined with their practice of maneuvers and arms drills made 
them formidable opponents. They relied heavily upon their cavalry, manned by the nobility, and 
their regular infantry were armed like Roman gladiators.82 The Persians are also said to have 
been clad in mail armor which covered their entire bodies and “the only spots a weapon could 
lodge were the tiny holes left for the eyes and nostrils.” Ammianus acknowledged the 
proficiency of their archers when he stated that they “practiced from the very cradle in a skill in 
which that people most excel.”83 The Persians were not lacking in siege warfare capabilities 
either. At the siege of Singara in 360, the Persians employed an exceptionally powerful ram as 
well as many other engines and were able to breach a round tower and take the fortress.84 The 
primary enemies of Rome at this time were quite formidable, with the Germanic tribes holding 
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the advantage in physical stature, while the Persians may have reached parity with Rome in 
armor, training, and military technology. 
The Roman army possessed at least the same level of technology as the Persians, but their 
system of organization did not provide any artillery at all to the ordinary legions. Instead, they 
appear to have raised separate legions of ballistarii. The reason behind this was that the Roman 
Empire suffered from a shortage of qualified personnel to build and operate their artillery.85 
During the siege of Amida, Ammianus mentions two Magnentian legions which had recently 
been transferred to the east from Gaul that were supposed to assist with the defensive machinery, 
but that these legions were useless in siege warfare.86 There is no reason to believe that these 
Magnentian legions were exceptions to the rule in the fourth century. Full utilization of artillery 
was further complicated by the lack of commanders who were able to appreciate what engines of 
war could do for them, and as such, artillery was not as large of a factor for the late Roman army 
as it otherwise could have been.87
There is some evidence that as the fourth century progressed, the Roman army went away 
from its previous practice of wearing body armor as more and more barbarians joined the army. 
While a fourth century set of mail armor has been discovered at Caerleon in South Wales, the 
lack of additional surviving evidence of infantry armor indicates that perhaps only the cavalry 
remained heavily armored so that it could deal with enemy cavalry which was likewise 
armored.88 Vegetius states that while the cavalry remained armored in the example of the Goths, 
Alans, and Huns, the infantry ceased to wear armor or helmets beginning with Emperor Gratian. 
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He further claimed that the reason for this was neglect of leadership in enforcing the soldiery to 
wear their armor and even after many defeats; no one had bothered to restore armor or helmets to 
the infantry.89  
If large numbers of barbarian units served in the army during this period, it would make 
sense that the discipline and abilities of the Roman army would have declined significantly. This 
would have especially been true in the west where the barbarian recruits would almost certainly 
have been Germanic in origin, and the conflicts in the west frequently involved Germanic tribes. 
At the Battle of Strasbourg in 357, Ammianus specifically states that the Romans enjoyed the 
advantage in training and discipline and this would have been difficult to achieve if the army did 
not consist largely of regular Roman units. Furthermore, Ammianus never gives the impression 
that an overall barbarization of the army took place.90 On the issue of armor, Ammianus 
specifically stated at the Battle of Adrianople in 378, the weight of their armor weakened the 
Roman soldiers. During the battle itself he indicated that “on both sides helmets and breast plates 
were split into pieces,” thus seemingly confirming that at least a majority of the Roman army 
that fought here was armored.91
It seems likely that only after Adrianople were large numbers of barbarians recruited into 
the army and the widespread armoring of the infantry may well have been abandoned. The losses 
suffered by the army at Adrianople and in battles leading up to Adrianople had been enormous, 
especially in the east. After Amida fell to the Persians almost all of the seven legions stationed 
there were lost.92 At least two further legions were lost when Singara fell shortly thereafter.93 
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The subsequent loss of the powerful fortress at Bezabde cost the Romans at least another three 
legions.94 Even worse, during a failed counter-attack on Bezabde by Constantius, the Romans 
“suffered severe and grievous losses of which the effect would long be felt.”95 By far the worst 
losses were still to come when at Adrianople an entire field army perished. Ammianus puts this 
loss into perspective when he states “it is certain that hardly a third of our army escaped. No 
battle in our history except Cannae was such a massacre.”96 The losses suffered during the late 
fourth century had a lasting effect on the future composition of the army, and after Adrianople 
the myth of invincibility held by the professional Roman army may have been forever 
shattered.97
The Romans required at least 20,000 new recruits just to replace the losses to the field 
army after Adrianople, and these men would not have been easy to find.98 This is especially true 
due to the difficulties in recruitment that existed in the late fourth century. Speaking on the 
character of the Gauls in 355 Ammianus writes, “no one here ever cuts off his thumb to escape 
military service, as happens in Italy, where they have a special name for such malingerers 
(murci).”99 Additional law codes indicate the problems with recruitment in Italy likely permeated 
much of the empire. In 364, Valentinian and Valens issued a law reconfirming the previous law 
established by Constantine that the sons of soldiers must serve in the military.100 The next year 
an additional law was issued stating that if a person of low status helped a deserter then he would 
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be sent to the mines and if a high status individual helped a deserter then he would be fined half 
of his total property.101 A third law issued in 368 stated that “if a person cuts off his fingers to 
avoid military service he will be sentenced to death and if his master fails to prevent him from 
this he will be severely punished.”102 Writing five years after Adrianople Themistius stated, 
“Thrace was overrun, Illyricum was overrun, armies vanished altogether, like shadows.”103 In 
382 unable to defeat the Goths, Emperor Theodosius made peace with them by granting them 
lands in Thrace.104 In these desperate times where recruitment was extremely difficult, any and 
all means of rebuilding an army would have been used, including the large scale recruitment of 
barbarians. The first mention of this on a significant scale comes from Emperor Theodosius’ 
employment of 20,000 barbarians at the Battle of Frigidus in 394. These barbarians fought under 
native commanders and were less disciplined than Roman soldiers, but the Romans needed 
manpower and this was something the barbarians could provide, for a price.105
The danger in this arrangement was that the barbarians were not likely to be as loyal as 
regular soldiers were. During a campaign against the Alamanni in 354, the discovery of a 
fordable river crossing potentially could have led to the destruction of the Alamanni: 
had not a few men of the same race, who had attained high rank in our army, sent 
a secret warning to their compatriots. That at any rate was what some believed, 
and suspicion fell on Latinus, count of the household troops, Agilo, the 
superintendant of the stables, and Scudilo, the general of the Scutarii, all men who 
were held in high respect as pillars of the state.106
 
It is likely that although all three of these men were raised in the Roman Empire, they still 
considered themselves to be ethnically Alemanni and it is very possible they gave away the 
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invasion plans to prevent their countrymen from being slaughtered.107 The Alemanni and 
Constantius were still able to come to a peace agreement, but this type of betrayal could not be 
taken lightly.108The Romans were so worried after Adrianople that they called forward all recent 
Gothic recruits, who had entered into the army in the eastern provinces, under the auspice of 
paying them money that they were due and executed them.109 The danger of relying on large 
numbers of barbarians in the army was certainly apparent to the Romans who knew these groups 
could not always be trusted. 
The pay of the Roman army did increase during the late fourth century and by 364 
soldiers received pay in gold coin. At this time, the infantry received five solidi annually while 
the cavalry received nine solidi.110 Julian provides an example that proves soldiers still received 
donatives. When his troops proclaimed him emperor, he promised them each five pieces of gold 
and a pound of silver.111 Julian also made sure that the troops posted along the Danube “should 
not lack either arms and clothing or pay and food.”112 At least during times of stability soldiers 
were receiving the supplies they needed. Several examples from Julian’s expedition against the 
Persians suggest that on campaign supplies were much harder to come by. While marching 
through Assyria for example the soldiers “were delighted to have ample subsistence without 
having to draw on the supplies carried by the ships.”113 Later on in the campaign the army 
marched through a region with many fields that contained vines and fruit trees and “the army 
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satisfied its appetite with ample food from this source, and where as men previously dreaded a 
dearth there was now a serious fear that they would overeat.”114 These examples illustrate that 
while the army did travel with supplies these were often inadequate to support the full needs of 
the army on a lengthy campaign. When Jovian accepted the horrendous peace offer of the 
Persians to end this campaign, it seems the Roman army was on the verge of starvation.115 A 
greater abundance of supplies for this campaign could very well have saved the Roman army 
from this desperate situation. 
Death of Theodosius to fall of Western Empire 
For the early fifth century, the most abundant information available on recruitment, 
training and the supply of the Roman army comes from Vegetius. While his writing is difficult to 
date it still provides useful insights that are not otherwise available. He states that skill and 
training, not numbers and untaught bravery produce victories. This indicates the preference for a 
professional army. Curiously, he follows this by suggesting that recruits for the army should be 
chosen from colder climates. Vegetius justifies this by stating people from warmer climates are 
more intelligent, but have less blood and are therefore more afraid of wounds, while recruits 
from cooler climates are less intelligent, but possess more blood and as such have a strong 
contempt for wounds and death. This is interesting as Italy and much of the Roman Empire had 
what could be termed a ‘warm’ climate and Germanic peoples would almost exclusively reside 
in ‘cooler’ climates. Exactly what this comment means is difficult to decipher as regions of the 
Roman Empire such as Gaul also have cooler climates, but this could signify an increased 
recruitment of Germanic peoples into the army. Vegetius also states recruits should come from 
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the country and not the city as the toil of the country better prepares men to be soldiers than does 
the ease of city life.116 This point makes sense, and as the vast majority of the population still 
lived in the country, did not significantly narrow the potential recruitment pool.  
On the subject of supply, large armies were difficult to support and Vegetius cites 
examples such as Xerxes, Darius, and Mithridates, whose extremely large armies fared poorly in 
combat due to their size. Vegetius recommends that armies remain smaller so that they can move 
more quickly and are easier to supply.117 Furthermore, stating that “armies are more often 
destroyed by starvation than battle,” Vegetius writes that the only remedy to the problem of 
supply is to store large quantities of provisions in advance within fortified locations. If taxes in 
kind proved inadequate, then advance payments of gold should be used to secure everything that 
is needed.118 Much of this advice is quite sound and suggests the base elements of recruitment, 
training, and supply were not lost in the early fifth century. It is more likely circumstances 
simply dictated that the only way to rebuild the army after the disasters of the fourth century was 
through the recruitment of large numbers of barbarian federates. 
Dating to around 400, the Notitia Dignitatum provides a list of all military units in both 
the East and the West. These units have a total estimated strength of 645,000 men, but this does 
not take into account the fact that many of these units were likely under strength. A current 
argument by Wolfgang Liebeschuetz states that at least 25% of the units given in the list were 
comprised of men with Germanic or non-citizen origins. These non-Roman units were known as 
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federates and throughout the first half of the fifth century, they grew in importance to the point 
that they vastly outnumbered regular Roman units in the field armies.119
This was the army inherited by the Roman general Stilicho, who effectively ruled the 
West for the young Emperor Honorius following the death of Theodosius in 395.120 From the 
beginning, Stilicho faced numerous barbarian invasions. The Roman policy of settling Visigoths 
within the empire had worked well from 382 to 395, but after this time Gothic forces roamed 
virtually unchecked through the empire.121 Their leader, Alaric, had led auxiliary units for 
Emperor Theodosius helping to win several key victories, but when he did not receive a proper 
military command for his efforts, Alaric led a Gothic rebellion in 395. In 402, Alaric invaded 
Italy, but Stilicho was able to force him to retreat, though the engagements appear to have been 
indecisive.122 Alaric became the least of Stilicho’s problems when in 405 a massive invasion 
crossed into Roman territory under the Gothic leader Radagaisus. To counter this threat, Stilicho 
mobilized 30 regiments from the field army of Italy and supplemented this with a contingent 
from the Rhine frontier, as well as Alan and Hunnic auxiliaries. With this force, Stilicho was 
able to trap Radagaisus in 406 and he even convinced a large portion of this barbarian army to 
join the Roman army. Radagaisus attempted to flee and was captured and executed.123
Stilicho was much less effective at dealing with the Vandals, Alans, and Suevi who burst 
across the Rhine on December 31, 406.124 Stilicho is often accused of stripping the frontier of 
soldiers leading up to this invasion to provide soldiers for his field army. While there is little 
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doubt that he removed troops, whether or not he recklessly ran down western defenses is 
debatable.125 What is not debatable is Stilicho’s failure to stop these incursions. The poet 
Orientus summed up the immediate effect of this invasion with the phrase, “all Gaul was filled 
with the smoke of a single funeral pyre.”126 The situation was so desperate that even slaves were 
permitted to enlist in the army, and would receive their freedom if they served faithfully.127 In 
407, at the height of this confusion Alaric once again invaded Italy. This time Stilicho managed 
to convince the senate to buy him off with a payment of 4,000 pounds of gold.128 The senator 
Lampadius famously observed that “such a gesture bought not peace but servitude.” This payoff 
to Alaric severely weakened Stilicho’s position at court.129 On August 13, 408 a number of 
Stilicho’s chief supporters died during a revolt started by the followers of Radagaisus, the same 
ones Stilicho had convinced to join him a mere few years earlier. Shortly thereafter Stilicho was 
himself murdered in Ravenna likely at the behest of Emperor Honorius.130
Following the death of Stilicho, soldiers loyal to Honorius slaughtered thousands of 
barbarians quartered in Italy, including women and children.131 Zosimus states that 30,000 
federates who survived this massacre deserted to Alaric when he again invaded Italy in 408, and 
with this loss, rendered the Roman army in Italy ineffective.132 This explains the lack of a 
military response to Alaric who three times put the city of Rome under siege, and finally as the 
Romans continued to ignore his demands, which actually shrank over time, sacked the city in 
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August of 410.133 From his position in Jerusalem, Saint Jerome captured the shock of this 
disaster by writing, “the city which had taken the whole world was itself taken; nay, it fell by 
famine before it fell by the sword.”134 Jerome’s shock could have been lessened had he known 
just how weak the Roman army actually was due to its heavy reliance on barbarian federates. 
While this was happening in Italy, in 409 the Vandals Alans and Suevi entered Spain and by 411 
had made themselves masters of the entire peninsula.135 This led the Romans to reemploy the 
same group of Goths which had only recently sacked Rome, though their leader Alaric was now 
dead, to fight once more for the empire in an attempt to rid Spain of barbarians. Following 
successful campaigning, these Gothic federates were settled on lands in Gaul.136 By 418, these 
Goths fully established themselves in the region of Aquitania as rulers of the land. This helps to 
illustrate how the barbarian federates were taking over not only the army, but much of the 
territory within the Roman Empire as well.137
Flavius Aetius was the other prominent figure to come to power for the Romans in the 
fifth century, becoming the leading general following the accession of Emperor Valentinian III in 
433 and virtual ruler of the Western Empire.138 Aetius’ rise to power was made possible only 
because he had at his disposal a strong force of Hunnic federates.139 Despite his relatively 
successful military career, Aetius was unable to prevent the fall of North Africa to the Vandals in 
439. This cost Rome its richest remaining province along with the primary source of food for the 
city of Rome. Being unable to launch an expedition to recover North Africa, Aetius was forced 
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to make peace with the Vandals who were supposed to become a client kingdom of federates, 
and for a time they did provide a small quantity of grain to help feed the city of Rome. 140
The most difficult challenge Aetius had to face arrived in 451, as the Huns invaded the 
West under their powerful ruler Attila. As Attila advanced he burned Metz to the ground along 
with all of its inhabitance and would likely have done the same to Orleans had Aetius not arrived 
with his Gothic and Frankish allies. These forces engaged Attila in battle and forced him to 
retreat.141 During this large-scale engagement, there is not a single specific reference to a unit of 
Roman soldiers fighting in the battle under Aetius. It is therefore possible the entire force which 
defeated Attila consisted of federates, and that professional Roman units had ceased to exist in 
the field army.142 Attila returned the following year to invade Italy, and Pope Leo took credit for 
stopping this invasion. He claimed to have convinced Attila to desist from his war and return to 
his homeland in peace.143 A more likely reason for Attila’s retreat was the famine and plague 
which was sweeping through his army. Furthermore, Aetius, along with the Eastern Emperor 
Marcian were harassing Attila’s troops in Italy, while additional forces from the East had 
launched an invasion northward into Attila’s heartland. Attila had no choice but to retreat. While 
preparing for a third invasion of the West, Attila died suddenly early in 453, removing this dire 
threat to the survival of the West.144
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With the Hunnic threat removed, in September 454 Emperor Valentinian had Aetius 
assassinated.145 After the death of Aetius and the loss of much of his federate army, the West 
desperately needed a regular field army, but this required regular supplies and it does not appear 
these could be squeezed from the western economy. Too much of the territory in the West was 
under the direct control of federates, and those units which did serve in the army in Italy were 
made up primarily of units from the tribal groups now dominant in Gaul and Spain.146 Emperor 
Valentinian was then himself assassinated by supporters of Aetius in March 455.147 The lack of a 
significant military presence in Italy is apparent from the complete absence of any attempt to 
prevent the Vandals from sacking Rome in June 455.148 One final attempt was made to save the 
West when in 468 what remained of western forces, combined with a massive expedition sent by 
Eastern Emperor Leo, attempted to reconquer North Africa from the Vandals. Vandal fire ships 
badly defeated this force at ruinous cost to the East.149 With no more help available and no 
regular army to guard Italy, there was nothing the Romans could do to prevent the last Western 
Roman Emperor, Romulus Augustulus, from being deposed in 476.150
The population loss of the second and third centuries caused a severe manpower shortage 
for the Roman military and this situation only got worse over time. The decision by Constantine 
to withdraw part of the military from the borders to create field armies was a serious mistake. 
More easily penetrable borders combined with increasingly formidable barbarian opponents led 
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to numerous wars which stretched the Roman military to the breaking point. When recruits could 
not be found for the army, barbarian federates became increasingly important for filling out the 
ranks. By the early fifth century, this situation reached a critical level and the examples provided 
by Stilicho and Aetius show us that the Roman army could no longer function without its 
federate units. However, these are only the military reasons for the western collapse. By 
examining the Roman economy, we can gain the full picture behind the fall of the Western 
Roman Empire. 
 
The Roman Economy 
 The basis for the late Roman economy was agriculture, and the taxation of agricultural 
production provided the majority of imperial income. Over time, ever-increasing taxation placed 
a massive burden on the Roman people with the majority of these taxes falling on the poorest 
members of society. The plight of the masses slowly ate away at the foundation of the Roman 
economy, especially following the final division of the empire in 395. The Roman economy in 
the West simply lost the ability to function in the face of overwhelming exterior and interior 
pressures. 
Third-Century Crisis  
By the onset of the Third-Century Crisis, the expenses of the Roman Empire were 
enormous. These included civilian administrative employees, the cost of the emperor’s 
household and court, handouts and entertainment for civilians and soldiers, building programs, 
gifts to important individuals, foreign subsidies, and the salary, discharge and maintenance costs 
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of the vastly expanded army.151 Military costs were by far the most expensive. In 235, there were 
an estimated 33 legions needing financial support with each soldier receiving 750 denarii per 
year. By comparing this figure with the 25 legions established under Emperor Augustus with 
each soldier receiving 225 denarii per year, the escalating costs of the Roman military become 
apparent.152  
Not all imperial expenses functioned with the strict purpose of running the empire, and 
many had the sole purpose of incurring favor with the people. Several examples from the 
Historia Augustae can help illustrate just how expensive this process could be. When mutinous 
soldiers murdered Emperor Gallienus in the hope of booty, the military elite placated them “by 
the usual means of winning their favor” by giving each soldier 20 aurei.153 In the early 270s, 
Emperor Aurelian gave a daily ration of bread, pork, and oil to all men within the city of Rome 
and planned to give them wine also, but restrained himself from this.154 A final example coming 
from the early 280s shows the waste of imperial resources quite clearly. The most noteworthy 
event from the reigns of Carus, Carinus, and Numerian was the series of games that they gave 
the Roman people.155 It is worth noting that the reigns of all three of these emperors were quite 
short, Carus likely died from a battle wound and both Carinus and Numerian fell to assassins, 
which might suggest they were not successful in their efforts to achieve popularity. The primary 
problem with these attempts was that they established precedents that future emperors were 
expected to follow. Giving donatives to the soldiers, feeding the people of Rome, and providing 
extravagant games could not be avoided if an emperor wished to retain his throne for an 
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extended period of time. In the late imperial period, these obligations became increasingly 
burdensome for the imperial administration. 
 To meet the growing expenses of the Roman Empire, increased taxation was required to 
bring in necessary revenue. Taxation on agriculture seems to have produced over 90 percent of 
imperial revenues.156 However, taxation had always been extremely unpopular and tax evasion 
was not uncommon.157 When this is combined with the severe instability during the Third-
Century Crisis, collecting taxes would have proven phenomenally difficult on an empire-wide 
basis. Where taxes could still be collected it appears that the level of taxation was beyond 
oppressive as can be seen in a petition to Emperor Philip the Arab in 245: 
We are suffering extortion and illegal exactions beyond all reason at the hands of 
those who ought to be preserving the public welfare…Soldiers, powerful men 
from the cities, and your own officials leave the highways, descend on us, take us 
from our work, seize our plough and oxen and illegally extort what is not due to 
them.158
 
The evidence above allows two conclusions to be drawn. First, those who could be taxed were 
taxed at extremely high levels, and secondly, in spite of this heavy taxation the Roman 
government still did not have enough money to meet its financial obligations. 
 This shortage of revenue is evident from the policy of many emperors during this period 
to heavily debase the coinage. This was not a new phenomenon as debasement of the coinage 
had occurred as far back as Emperor Nero, but the rate of the debasement took place on a scale 
never before seen in the Roman Empire.159  After 235, emperors debased silver coinage, and 
raised taxes repeatedly to meet financial shortages hoping that windfall profits from military 
victories would make these measures temporary. The problem with this theory was that there 
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were no windfall profits to be had as wars were simply no longer profitable. Every emperor from 
Decius to Claudius II debased the silver antoninianus condemning his predecessors’ money to 
the melting pot. By 260, rapid recoinages of currency only a few years old destroyed public 
confidence in imperial money.160 This loss of confidence in imperial coinage is further 
confirmed by an Egyptian document from 260 which states: 
Whereas the bankers stand publically accused of closing the money exchanges 
because they will not accept the divine coin of the emperors, it has become 
necessary to issue this order to them to open again, and exchange all coin except 
the truly spurious and counterfeit.161
 
Not only had confidence in imperial coinage dissipated, but this text also reveals a further 
problem involving counterfeit coinage. This problem had likely existed as long as money has 
exchanged hands as a medium of exchange, but it seems probable that counterfeiting at this time 
was much easier due to the plethora of debased coinage in circulation. In 275, the emperor 
Tacitus attempted to address this counterfeiting problem when he ordained that “if anyone, either 
officially or privately, alloyed silver with copper, or gold with silver, or copper with lead, it 
should be a capital offence, involving confiscation of property.”162  
 With the imperial currency in shambles, the requisition of supplies became largely the 
same as taxation in kind.163 While collecting revenue in the form of taxes in kind did help to 
cover many of the states’ needs, the state still required money for such important tasks as 
maintaining and paying the army.164 However, by the rule of Emperor Gallienus in the 260s the 
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antoninianus contained less than five percent silver.165 This meant that when imperial coinage 
actually was accepted, it was only done so well below its rated value. For example, from the time 
of the early empire to that of Emperor Gallienus, the price of wheat had risen over a hundred 
times, while during the same period a soldiers’ wage had barely doubled.166 The empire required 
extreme currency reforms and there is evidence that Emperor Aurelian made some progress in 
this area in 274. During his reign, Aurelian reconquered many of the previously lost Roman 
provinces and appears to have reestablished regular tax collection throughout the Roman world. 
He also made attempts at restoring the reputation of imperial coinage and he fixed rates of 
exchange to help roll back prices.167 The level of success of these measures taken by Aurelian is 
difficult to determine due to a severe lack of documentation that plagues the entire period of the 
Third-Century Crisis, but at the very least, the empire continued to hold itself together. 
 One key explanation for the severe debasement of the coinage during the Third-Century 
Crisis, and under many emperors thereafter is a sharp decline in mining during the late empire. 
An initial look at mining in the Iberian Peninsula might on the surface support this conclusion as 
large-scale mines show a marked drop in production of gold, silver, and tin after the first and 
second centuries C.E. However, the mines known about today which existed during this period 
are primarily only the large-scale mining operations, and little is known about smaller-scale 
mining. This is because the mines that have been identified are largely those that have been 
reopened in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and only larger mines were worth the time 
and effort to reopen, and as such many small-scale mines have yet to be identified. Over time, 
easily obtainable ore from larger mines became exhausted and this very well could have led to 
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the development of numerous smaller mines. The current evidence seems to indicate that it is 
possible and even likely that a large number of smaller mines could have supplied much of the 
metal needs for the late empire, meaning that debasement was not just a side effect from a lack 
of raw metal.168 Severe shortages in raw metals, while they did occur, were more due to periods 
of instability than they were a cause of mining operations not having the potential to meet the 
requirements of the empire. This helps to explain how Emperor Aurelian may have been able to 
restore the reputation of imperial currency. There is evidence that even with the loss of Dacian 
mines, following the evacuation of Dacia in the early 270s, he was able to reopen enough mines 
to offset these mineral losses, and as such a higher level of purity could have been obtained for 
his imperial coinage.169  
 As the Roman Empire emerged from the Third-Century Crisis, the devastation wrought 
by this terrible period fell disproportionately on the lower classes. The origins of this can be 
traced back to 212. When in this year Emperor Caracalla gave Roman citizenship to virtually all 
free Romans, the entitlements and privileges of Roman citizenship were lost. New class 
distinctions began to develop between the wealthy upper class, known as the honestiores, and the 
rest of the population called the humiliores. As time went by the wealthy devised methods to 
more directly exploit the poorer masses from their positions of power and the gap between the 
honestiores and the humiliores continued to widen. This impoverishment and exploitation of the 
masses was the primary cause of peasants becoming increasingly tied to the land throughout the 
late empire.170 With the economic condition of peasants in a steady decline, there was no 
incentive for peasants to have large families, as these could not be supported. While specific 
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methods of how peasants attempted to control the size of their families is unclear, throughout the 
fourth and fifth centuries conditions never presented themselves to allow for the repopulation of 
the Roman Empire.171
Diocletian  
Emperor Diocletian, who came to power in 284, helped restore order to the Roman 
Empire. He stabilized the frontiers and checked all serious barbarian incursions. Beginning 
largely in 293 with the creation of the Tetrarchy, imperial expenses increased greatly. This new 
system divided the empire amongst four separate rulers, which meant the support of four 
separate imperial courts and residences. Furthermore, Diocletian increased the number of 
provinces to just over a hundred, nearly double the previous number, and all of these new 
provinces needed numerous administrative officials. An equestrian vice-prefect headed each of 
the twelve administrative dioceses created to run the provinces under this new system. By 305, 
senatorial governors had all but disappeared, as the equestrian order now became the path to high 
office under this new system.172 Diocletian also increased the pay and size of the army. 
Estimates for the size of Diocletian’s army range around 400,000 men at the beginning of his 
reign to as high as 600,000 men by the time of his abdication in 305.173 In 293, each soldier 
received 360 silver clad nummi as their annual wage.174 This would have placed a significant 
financial burden on the imperial administration. 
 To fund these imperial expenditures, Diocletian initiated substantial reforms to the 
system of taxation around 297. These reforms focused around two components, the iugum and 
the caput. The iugum was theoretically the acreage that could be cultivated by one man to 
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support his family, and this figure varied systematically according to the productivity of the land. 
The caput stood for one man, with additions made for his household including women, children, 
slaves and tenants often at less than one caput. For example, a woman or child might count as 
only ½ caput. A global survey of resources was carried out to properly determine the precise 
amount of production throughout the empire and this was initially to be carried out every five 
years, but was changed to every fifteen years at a later date. The goal of this system was to allow 
taxes to be collected more fairly based on production throughout the entire empire. This new 
system resulted in Italy losing its old privilege of tax exemption which it had enjoyed for 
centuries. On September 1st of each year the state’s total requirements would be published and 
could then be passed on to the provincial governors who were responsible for collecting their 
share of the total tax obligation of the empire.175 The ancient Christian writer Lactantius stated 
that the beneficiaries of public expenditure, officials and soldiers, had become more numerous 
than the taxpayers themselves.176 Lactantius further believed that supporting the greatly 
increased bureaucracy and army caused farmers’ resources to become exhausted, which led to 
the desertion of fields and cultivated lands became forests.177 It must be remembered however 
that Lactantius was a Christian, and as Diocletian persecuted Christians throughout his reign, his 
account may be extremely biased. Whatever the direct effects of this new system of taxation 
were, it remained in place for the next century and subsequent emperors used it to revise the 
imperial budget steadily upward.178
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 To facilitate this new system of taxation Diocletian drastically reformed imperial coinage, 
taking three decisive steps in 293. First, he fixed the gold aureus at 60 to a pound. Next, he 
reminted silver argentei at 96 to the pound rated at 25 denarii.179 The purpose of this pure silver 
coinage was largely to combat the high quality silver coinage issued by the rebel Carausius in 
Britain at this time, and was not intended for long-term use.180 Finally, Diocletian issued a new 
silver-wash piece known as the nummus rated at 5 denarii. Diocletian intended the aureus and 
the nummus to replace all other coinage, and he had hundreds of millions of nummi struck. 
Unfortunately for Diocletian, lack of confidence in the nummus, combined with the nummus 
appearing in such great numbers, flooded the market and required new sets of values to be 
frequently set for coinage just to keep pace with inflation. Diocletian’s Edict of Maximum 
Prices, issued in 301, stipulated a price of 72,000 denarii for a pound of gold which may have 
helped stabilize the value of gold coinage. This first edict was followed the same year by a 
second Monetary Edict which doubled the value of all denominations above one denarii. In a 
single stroke all taxes, prices, and salaries computed in denarii were sliced in half, while the 
rates of exchange among higher denominations were preserved.181 In spite of all his efforts, 
continued rampant inflation throughout his entire reign shows that Diocletian was unable to 
stabilize the monetary system. 
 Diocletian’s Edict of Maximum Prices is one of the most famous inflationary control 
documents to survive from antiquity, both for its scope, and for its colossal failure. Diocletian 
clearly blamed inflation on the merchants as can be seen in the preamble to this edict that states, 
“men who, individually abounding in great riches which could completely satisfy whole nations, 
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try to capture smaller fortunes and strive for ruinous percentages.” This was, of course, largely 
untrue as many merchants were not wealthy, but they were convenient scapegoats and disliked 
by elites in general. The preamble goes on to state that the edict is not trying to fix prices, it only 
wishes to set a maximum to combat the greed of merchants and make goods affordable, and the 
edict should be “observed in the whole of our empire”. The preamble ends by stating that anyone 
who breaks this edict, including those who withdraw items from the general market, are subject 
to capital punishment.182  
This edict immediately ran into problems of its own making. First of all, no allowance 
was made for transportation costs. The price of Italian wine, for example, must have varied 
greatly between places such as Rome, London and Antioch and these prices could have easily 
exceeded the maximum set in the edict. The key failure of the edict proved to be that in many 
cases the maximum prices were set too low. Two published prices that can be compared with the 
edict from this time period come from Egyptian papyrus, listing the price of wheat at 300 
drachmae per artaba and Macedonian petroselinum, which was a highly valued spice, at 800 
drachmae per ounce. The maximum prices listed in the edict are 100 drachmae per artaba for 
wheat and 170 denarii per pound for petroselinum. In the second example, the difference 
between the market price and the maximum price set is enormous.183 Lactantius certainly 
believed the edict was a failure as he stated that it caused nothing to appear for sale and after 
much blood was spent, the law was repealed.184 Evidence indicates that Lactantius’ conclusion 
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was correct, because within several years, as prices continued to climb, the edict was quietly 
allowed to lapse.185
 The Edict of Maximum Prices does give some very useful comparative data on the 
subject of slavery. The maximum price of a male slave between the ages of 16 and 40 was listed 
at 30,000 denarii and a female slave in the same age group has a maximum price of 25,000 
denarii. By comparing this price with the wage of the top skilled labor worker listed in the edict, 
a picture painter who received a mere 150 denarii per day, the evidence strongly suggests slaves 
were becoming extremely expensive. This very well could have led to an increased used of 
peasant coloni by wealthy landowners, as it is quite possible that they were significantly cheaper 
and more abundant than slaves were.186 Coloni did not have the high initial purchase cost as 
slaves did, and furthermore they were relatively easy to keep from moving off their land while 
many slaves might attempt to escape. Diocletian frequently settled barbarian tribes within the 
Roman Empire as coloni, as can be seen from the Chamavi and the Frisians who were defeated 
in 295 and settled on vacant lands in Gaul, so an overall increase in this segment of the 
population is likely.187
 Coloni traditionally enjoyed freedom of movement from place to place, but in difficult 
times, it was easy for these tenants to fall behind on rent payments and other debts to their 
landlords, causing many to become tied to the land. Diocletian also began the process of turning 
the Roman economy into a command economy. Beginning with arsenals designed to ensure 
military production, and followed by strategic industries such as textiles, minting, and heavy 
industry, the state began to directly supervise the production of all major facets of the economy 
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until virtually every industry was under government control. With the need for skilled workers in 
many of these industries, mobility within any industry would have been severely restricted.188
Constantine  
Emperor Constantine came to power as emperor in 306 and gained control of the western 
empire by defeating his rival Maximian at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge in 312. After his 
victory, Constantine converted to Christianity, as he believed that the Christian God helped him 
win the battle.189 The reason or motive behind Constantine’s conversion has long been debated, 
but this is much less important than the changes within the Roman Empire this conversion 
caused. One of these changes was the need to support a new state religion. These expenses would 
have included the costs of building, enlarging, decorating and maintaining numerous churches, 
as well as supporting the poorer clergy of the church. Christian emperors often gave imperial 
subventions or properties to help support and provide for the growth of the church.190 
Constantine also decided to build the new imperial capital at Byzantium known as 
Constantinople. Constantinople was founded in 324 and dedicated in 330. To prepare this city to 
become his capital, Constantine rebuilt the wall, constructed a Hippodrome, built a massive 
imperial palace, as well as an exceedingly fine forum.191 These were only the most noteworthy 
building projects as the construction of Constantinople required 80,000 workers and as such, this 
project likely placed a major strain on the imperial budget.192
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 A more positive result of Constantine’s conversion was the unusual windfall of gold that 
he was able to obtain through the confiscations of his rivals’ accumulated reserves and property, 
and also through the confiscation of treasures from pagan temples.193 Using this gold, and most 
especially through the reminting of the heavy gold aurei of his pagan rivals, Constantine was 
able to impose his gold solidus on the Roman world.194 Constantine minted the gold solidus at 72 
to the pound and the weight and purity of this coin was to remain unchanged for over seven 
centuries.195 This allowed the solidus to enjoy vast purchasing power in a society that was still in 
the grip of massive inflation.196 Dating from the last years of Constantine’s reign, large amounts 
of new gold coinage appeared, likely as part of a plan to allow gold to be used in transactions and 
exchanges throughout the empire.197
 While gold coinage was firmly in place, the silver coinage issued by Constantine and his 
successors through the end of the fourth century did not meet with the same level of success as 
the price of silver fluctuated greatly relative to the price of gold.198 The stability of silver coinage 
suffered greatly from Constantine’s repeated debasement of the nummi. In 307, Constantine’s 
nummi lost 35 to 40 percent of its weight and silver content. By 325, the nummus was at 30 
percent of the weight and less than 15 percent of the silver content of the nummus of 305.199 
Throughout the fourth century, inflation ruined Tetrarchic silver-clad coins in favor of token 
bronze coins.200 As long as an individual could deal in gold, inflation was not a significant 
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problem, but the majority of the population was not wealthy, and for them dealing in gold was 
simply not an option. 
 Constantine’s reign also led to new changes for the peasant population. The programs 
started under Diocletian to offer the government control over the production of the Roman 
economy came into full force. The result of this was that generations of workers became bound 
to their professions through hereditary obligations.201 Not all social groups saw their status 
deteriorate under the reign of Constantine; Constantine seems to have encouraged slave owners 
to free their slaves by issuing the law that any master can proclaim his slave to be free in a 
church as long as a bishop is present.202 A separate law stated that a slave owner could beat his 
slave with sticks and whips, but if the slave owner abuses his rights and performs an act with the 
intention of killing the slave, then he may be accused of homicide.203 A third law, dated from 
322, states that: 
We have learned that provincials suffering from lack of sustenance and the 
necessities of life are selling or pledging their own children. There, if any such 
person should be found who is sustained by no substance of family fortune and 
who is supporting his children with suffering and difficulty, he shall be assisted 
through Our fisc before he becomes a prey to calamity.204
This law seems to indicate that the government did not wish to see poverty drive the population 
into slavery. However, it also suggests that an advanced state of poverty already existed for the 
masses, otherwise this law would not have been enacted. One additional decree issued by 
Constantine stated that the “governing bodies of communities be held liable for properties that 
had been abandoned.”205 It stands to reason that if this law were being enacted, then large tracts 
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of land must have been abandoned throughout the empire. This would then indicate that taxation 
and oppression of the lower classes was leading to peasants either losing or abandoning their 
lands, and with no other option open to them, many of these peasants would have become coloni. 
 While the very bottom of Roman society seems to have been receiving aid, the coloni 
were rapidly losing their rights. The first direct evidence that coloni had become tied to the land 
comes from a law dated from 332 that states: 
Any persons with whom a colonus belonging to some other person is found, shall 
not only restore him to his place of origin but be liable for his poll tax for the 
period. It will furthermore be proper that coloni themselves who plan flight 
should be put in irons like slaves, so that they may be compelled by a servile 
penalty to perform the duties appropriate to them as free men.206
 
By this period, it had become essential to keep the land and the workers on the land producing a 
taxable income so the empire could continue to function normally.207 This would explain why 
tenants near Antioch, who did not have any land of their own, were registered for the purpose of 
taxation under the estates of their landlords.208 The freedom of the coloni was no longer a 
concern for the emperor. 
Death of Constantine through Theodosius  
From the death of Constantine in 337 to the end of the fourth century, the Roman Empire 
held together, in spite of the infighting that took place between Constantine’s sons and other 
claimants to the throne, and the disastrous losses incurred at Adrianople in 378. While the empire 
remained largely intact, this period was characterized by continued inflation and ever-increasing 
taxation. Despite the increased oppression of taxation, emperors still were not frugal with their 
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money as can be seen from the example of Constantius who in 354, celebrated the 13th year of 
his reign with extravagant shows in both the theatre and the circus.209 Furthermore, the army was 
becoming more and more expensive to fund and by 364 each infantryman received 5 solidi 
annually and each cavalryman received 9 solidi per year. Added to this was the estimated annual 
cost of supporting each soldier at 36 solidi, with an additional 20-25 solidi per year necessary to 
support the horses of cavalrymen.210 Emperors Constantius II and Theodosius, in the years 370 
to 395, needed large numbers of pure solidi to pay tribes hired as federates and to pay barbarians 
enrolled in elite Roman units who would only accept payment in high quality gold coinage.211 
Donatives did not disappear either during this period, and it appears the troops were becoming 
more and more difficult to win over. When Emperor Julian was on campaign against the Persians 
in 363, he promised each man 100 pieces of silver following a successful siege, after which he 
had to give a speech to pacify his men because “the smallness of this sum was provoking 
something not far from mutiny.”212
 As previously mentioned, coinage was crucial for paying many of the expenses during 
this period and efforts were made to save silver coinage so that it could serve the economy 
alongside gold coinage. In 354, following his victory in civil war, Emperor Constantius II tried to 
improve the monetary order by outlawing coins of the usurper Magnentius, removing low value, 
debased coins from circulation, and by initiating new, more stable pieces.213 Inflation, the enemy 
of these reforms, made sure that they had no chance of saving silver coinage. In the forty year 
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period from 324 to the reign of Julian, the value of the denarius had sunk from 4,500 to the 
solidus to about 30,000,000 to the solidus.214  
This same inflation did not affect gold coinage which continued to remain strong. In fact, 
by the end of the fourth century, solidi had become so abundant that all taxes and salaries were 
paid in gold and most transactions, except the smallest, were conducted in gold.215 By the 380s, 
small Syrian villages were even paying protection money directly in gold coinage.216 The spread 
of gold coinage did not prevent the rich from exploiting the poor as can be seen from Emperor 
Julian’s time in Antioch beginning in July of 362. According to Julian’s own account, the people 
complained of merchants and landowners possessing abundant goods, but selling them only at 
extremely high prices. Julian attempted to convince the local elite to remedy the situation, but 
when they failed to do so, Julian fixed prices to make goods more affordable. Just like Diocletian 
before him, Julian failed in his attempt at economic interference. Now it is likely that wherever 
the emperor went, inflation would follow him as he traveled with a large entourage at all times, 
but this does not mean the gouging of the general population did not take place on a regular 
basis. It is quite possible that the emperor being present was simply the only way for situations 
like this to be brought to his attention.217  
There is strong evidence that taxation in the later portion of the fourth century was 
becoming exceedingly burdensome for much of the population. Under Constantius II, 
magistrates financed virtually all local services in cities, and this was imposed as a hereditary 
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burden.218 When future emperor Julian left Gaul in 355, he reduced the tax to 7 solidi per caput 
instead of the 25 solidi per caput tax that had been in place when he arrived there.219 This 
strongly suggests that the rate of taxation that had been present in Gaul was too high. Ammianus 
provides further evidence of this when in 357, Julian refused to allow the praetorian prefect 
Florentius to make a special tax levy on Gaul. Ammianus believed that Julian “realized that after 
being plundered on all sides it was extremely difficult for them to produce normal taxes, and that 
even torture could not get a supplement out of them.”220 Gaul had been recently attacked by 
barbarians and as such taxes would have been harder to pay than would have normally been 
expected, but there is no reason to believe that the extremely high rate of taxation found in Gaul 
during this period was an exception to the level of taxation throughout the empire. 
 Emperor Valens, who came to power in the east in 364, appears to have had some 
success in curbing the rising level of taxation, but his co-emperor in the West, Valentinian II, had 
no such luck and taxes continued to rise.221 This fact helps to illustrate the discrepancy in tax 
revenues between the eastern and western portions of the empire. While rates of taxation in the 
East stabilized and were able to support this portion of the empire, in the West these rates 
continued to increase constantly. A decree issued by Valentinian and Valens in 366 indicates that 
many individuals may have been cheating on their taxes. The goal of this decree was to crack 
down on underweight or counterfeit solidi and it stated that all solidi collected into an account to 
be paid as taxes must be “reduced to a firm and solid mass of refined gold.” The danger in being 
caught dealing in underweight or fake coinage would have been great, so for this to be happening 
enough that a law had to be issued against it, indicates high rates of taxation must have been 
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forcing people to take desperate measures.222 A key factor in rising taxation and tax evasion was 
the giving away of imperial lands to federates who were not required to pay taxes to the Roman 
government. Emperor Theodosius did this on a large-scale, especially in dealing with the Goths, 
and this practice, which continued into the fifth century, steadily eroded the resource base of the 
empire.223
The exact effect that high levels of taxation had on the population of the empire during 
this period is difficult to measure, but several key examples can help to illustrate the desperation 
and anger that many people may have felt. Libanius provides one good example when he 
described the affect that a drought had on the people of Antioch in 365. “Everywhere there is 
poverty, beggary, and tears; farmers think it better to be beggars than farmers, and the man to 
give alms today is tomorrow himself in need of alms.”224 This suggests that farmers were unable 
to maintain any kind of a reserve so when disaster struck, they had no safety net to prevent them 
from losing everything. In 392, the church’s right of granting asylum was abolished with regard 
to debtors of the treasury indicating that many people were unable to pay their taxes.225 Suffering 
from this extreme poverty, it would not be surprising that many people would have resented the 
Roman government. The example of Balkan miners fighting alongside the invading Visigoths in 
378 is a good example of how heavy taxation could lower the allegiance of Roman citizens to 
their government.226
The tying of larger and larger portions of the population to the land would not have 
helped the popularity of the government, but this did take place during this period. By 367, 
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children of a free man and a colona woman were required to follow the status of the mother.227 A 
law dated to 371 from Emperor Valentinian stated: 
We declare that coloni and inquilini (tenant farmers) throughout Illyricum and the 
neighboring regions cannot have the liberty of leaving the land on which they are 
found to reside by virtue of their origin and descent. Let them be slaves of the 
land, not by the tie of the tax, but under the name and title of coloni. 
 
A more explicit example of this can be found in a constitution issued by Emperor Theodosius 
between 392 and 395 which stated: 
Throughout the entire diocese of Thrace the census of the poll tax is abolished 
forever and only the land tax will be paid. And in case it may seem that 
permission has been given to coloni, freed from the ties of their taxable condition, 
to wander and go off where they will, they are themselves to be bound by the 
right of origin, and though they appear to be free men by condition are 
nevertheless to be held to be slaves of the land itself to which they were born, and 
are not to have the right to go off where they will or change their domicile. The 
landowners are to control them with the care of patrons and the power of 
masters.228
 
While there is some evidence in this second law of some much needed tax relief, the key point to 
be taken from both of these laws is that coloni had fallen to the level of nothing more than slaves 
of the land which they resided upon. 
 A rare mention of the lower classes receiving imperial aid comes from a law dated to 391 
which again dealt with the subject of selling children into slavery. This law stated that all 
freeborn children who had been sold as slaves must be set free and if this slave had worked for 
his master for a considerable amount of time, then the master could not even ask for the price of 
the slave to be repaid.229 The government continued to pay close attention to the issue of poor 
citizens, especially children, ending up as slaves, but there is no evidence the government was 
doing anything to stop the institution of slavery itself. Ammianus mentions a slave receiving 300 
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lashes for being slow in bringing his master hot water.230 While Ammianus may have felt that 
this punishment was extreme, the mention of a slave in this casual context indicates that slavery 
as a practice was still extremely common. The late fourth century bishop Basil of Caesarra even 
went so far as to speak out in favor of slavery, stating, “it is better for a man who lacks 
intelligence and self-control to become another’s possession. Governed by his master’s 
intelligence, he will become like a chariot driven by a skilled horseman.”231 The church did not 
condemn slavery nor did it die out in the late Roman world. The Roman government offered 
protection against children being sold into slavery simply because controlling peasants as coloni 
had become the preferred labor control method, thus making state support for slavery 
unnecessary. 
 Whether due to high taxation or various other factors, there is strong evidence to support 
the progressive abandonment of land in the late fourth century. In a survey of the province of 
Asia, Emperor Valens found that of 6,736 ½ fertile iuga, 703 were “deserted and now in bad 
condition and sterile.”232 This corresponds with an edict issued in 371 that forbade heirs to retain 
only cultivated lands of their inheritance under the penalty of the confiscation of the whole.233 
This abandonment of land decreased the output of the empire as a whole, likely by a significant 
amount, and the tax burden that would have fallen on the remaining population could only have 
increased by a large margin. This would have been especially true for the western portion of the 
empire after 395, as with the death of Emperor Theodosius in that year the empire was divided 
between east and west for the last time, never to be reunited again. This placed the economically 
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weaker and strategically more vulnerable West at a severe disadvantage compared to its eastern 
counterpart. This is not to say that there was no longer cooperation between East and West, but 
each of these two portions of the empire would have looked after its own well-being before it 
attempted to help the other.234
Death of Theodosius to fall of Western Empire  
The key addition to the imperial budget that took place in the early fifth century was the 
extortionary payments that many emperors had to give barbarians to keep them from attacking 
the empire. The payment of 4,000 pounds of gold to Alaric to keep him from invading Italy is a 
prime example.235 An additional example comes from Eastern Roman Emperor Theodosius II 
paying the Huns an annual tribute of 700 pounds of gold in the 420s with this amount increasing 
to 2,100 pounds by 447. It is possible that this represented 5% of imperial revenue.236
 Gold solidi continued to hold their value, which helped to ensure that the barbarians were 
satisfied with their payoffs, but virtually all other Roman coinage disappeared. In 395, Western 
Emperor Honorius outlawed all nummi except two extremely low value pieces. Soon after 400, 
no silver or bronze coins stood between high level gold and the lowest level bronze coins. The 
wave of barbarian assaults that struck the Roman world, especially in the west, from 395-417 
would have been extremely disruptive to mining and tax collection operations throughout 
Europe. This was especially true due to the almost complete loss of Gaul and Spain. Though 
some of these lands were later recovered, it would have been extremely difficult to restore these 
lands to a stable state of productivity.237 This is not to say that these invasions led to a severe 
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shortage in gold coinage; there is no evidence to support this conclusion at all. It appears likely 
that enough reserves in coinage were available for gold to continue to function as the currency of 
the empire. Furthermore, these invasions did not cause mining to stop completely, even in 
remote areas of the empire. A recent discovery provides evidence of a gold mining operation that 
took place during the fifth and sixth centuries at Bir Umm Fawakhir in the Eastern Desert.238 
Previously it had been thought no mining had taken place in this region during this time period. 
Additional gold mines of this era could be found in North-west Spain, when it was under 
imperial control, and Illyricum. The Theodosian Code also mentions metallarii or miners in both 
Italy and Gaul, and while these references are nonspecific, they could refer to gold miners.239 All 
evidence points to mining continuing throughout the late empire at a much higher rate than had 
been previously thought. 
 The final collapse of the Western Roman economy can be traced through taxation, or 
more specifically, the lack of taxation which was actually being collected by the imperial 
government. In 397, taxes owed by senators were in arrears throughout many of the remaining 
provinces.240 In 412, the Visigoths who ruled the Aquitaine region of Gaul not only did not have 
to pay imperial taxes, but they even minted their own solidi. While these were not accepted on 
par with Roman solidi, this does illustrate just how little control or sway the Western Roman 
Empire had on these regions that had been given to federate peoples.241 The Christian writer 
Augustine gives an indication of the economic condition of North Africa in the early 420s when 
he recorded: 
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There are so many of those in Africa who are commonly called ‘slave dealers’ 
that they seem to be draining Africa of much of its human population and 
transferring their ‘merchandise’ to the provinces across the sea. Almost all of 
these are free persons. Only a few are found to have been sold by their parents, 
and these people buy them, not as Roman laws permit, as indentured servants for 
a period of twenty-five years, but in fact they buy them as slaves and sell them 
across the sea as slaves.242
 
This large slave population could only have been the result of worsening economic conditions 
that forced numerous individuals into indentured servitude. This placed large numbers of poor 
people at the mercy of these ‘slave dealers’ and clearly shows the desperation that must have 
been felt by many members of the lower classes. 
 The anger of the general population boiled over in the form of revolts, likely over 
excessive levels of taxation, in 417, 435-7, and 442. Each case required strong military forces to 
put down the revolt. A severe blow fell on what remained of the Western Roman Empire when in 
439 the Vandals captured Carthage and with it conquered the Roman province of North Africa. 
Not only had this been by far the wealthiest remaining province, which meant it had paid the 
most in taxes, North Africa had also supplied the majority of the grain to feed the city of 
Rome.243 The abolishment of all tax privileges in 441 by the Emperor Valentinian III at the 
request of the very landowners who directly benefited from them, indicates how serious 
problems had become for the imperial treasury.244 In 444, Emperor Valentinian publically 
admitted that: 
If we claim these expenses from the landowner in addition to what he already 
pays, such an exaction will crush his last feeble strength: if again we demand 
them from the merchants, they will inevitably sink under the weight of such a 
burden.245
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Even after this public declaration that further taxation would be disastrous, Valentinian still 
imposed a 1/24 sales tax.246 The final straw came in 468 when the Western Emperor Anthemius 
and his eastern colleague Leo I launched a joint expedition, largely funded by the Eastern 
Empire, against the Vandals with the goal of reconquering North Africa. This expedition ended 
in total disaster and estimates for the cost of the expedition range between 7 ½ and 9 ½ million 
solidi.247 With no further help available, the now ruined western Roman economy could no 
longer support even the most basic financial needs of its government. 
 As we have seen, from the third-century onward taxation increased throughout the 
Roman Empire to a level which heavily overburdened the lower classes of society. This 
excessive taxation, combined with the oppression of elites, forced many peasants to become 
coloni. Over time, the rights of coloni declined substantially until they were little more than 
peasants tied to the land on which they were born. This constant oppression of the peasant class 
did not allow the population of the Roman Empire to recover from the losses that it had suffered 
in centuries past, and thus the tax base of the empire could not expand. Following the final 
division of the empire in 395, the economically weaker West quickly lost the ability to 
financially support itself, which in turn led to economic crisis and eventual collapse.   
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The Western Roman Empire fell from the slow erosion of both the economy and military 
from the third-century onward. This decline began with the population loss suffered during the 
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Third-Century Crisis. Instead of working to help the peasant class repopulate the empire, the 
privileged honestiores focused on subjugating the general population which was already 
overburdened by excessive taxation. This succeeded in turning the general population into 
coloni, who were essentially serfs. This in turn removed the ability of peasants to support large 
families, and thus indirectly acted as a type of population control. The high cost of slaves 
indicated as early as the Edict of Diocletian, shows why the honestiores fought to keep this 
system in place to maintain their status at the top of Roman society. 
 While this process was taking place, Constantine’s decision to create large field armies 
and remove many troops from border defense could only have encouraged barbarian attacks. 
While most barbarian societies were primitive by Roman standards, they were certainly capable 
of understanding that an attack on Roman territory was more likely to penetrate the frontier and 
acquire substantial booty if fewer Roman soldiers directly opposed them on the borders. Whether 
or not a field army could defeat these barbarians at a later date would not likely have factored 
highly into the barbarians’ decision to invade. Even if a field army did succeed in driving the 
barbarians out of Roman territory, the destruction wrought by the invasion could not easily be 
undone. The bottom line was that field armies increased security for emperors, but did so at the 
direct expense of adequately defending Roman borders. This caused peasants living near many 
borders to suffer greatly and likely led to abandonment of frontier lands at the first threat of 
invasion. 
 The final division of the empire following the death of Theodosius in 395 had a 
significantly negative impact on the West. The East benefited greatly from this, as this portion of 
the empire was economically stronger and strategically less vulnerable. The East brought in tax 
revenues estimated at three times greater than those produced in the West, while at the same time 
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the West had nearly double the length of frontier to defend.248 This was a recipe for disaster. To 
field the necessary forces to attempt to defend all of its borders, the Western Roman Empire 
levied ever-greater taxes on its already overtaxed population. This massive financial burden may 
well have caused large segments of the Roman population to prefeer barbarian rule to that of the 
Romans.249  
 While it is a controversial subject, criticism of the East for not doing more to help 
the West during the fifth century ignores the many dire concerns facing the East. First and 
foremost of these was Persia, which required large numbers of troops be kept in Armenia and 
Mesopotamia to deal with this potential threat.250 A recent argument holds that the only sign that 
the East even recognized the sack of Rome in 410 was the three days of public mourning 
declared in Constantinople.251 Stilicho likely did not receive support from the East because he 
claimed guardianship over Theodosius’ other son, Eastern Emperor Arcadius, and hoped to one-
day control both portions of the empire. The fall of Stilicho from power likely pleased the 
eastern aristocracy, but there is no evidence of an eastern desire for Rome itself to fall.252 As 
previously stated, the East did help in dealing with Attila and they provided the bulk of the 
money and troops for the attempted retaking of North Africa in 468. Lack of support from the 
East was not a primary cause for the fall of the Western Roman Empire.  
The increasing reliance upon barbarian federates during the fifth century significantly 
weakened the Western Roman military. Following the disaster at Adrianople, increasing 
numbers of less than reliable federates began to fill the military ranks. When Germanic 
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barbarians crossed into Roman territory in 406, Stilicho was unable to use his field army, which 
contained a large number of federates, to stop the invasion. Stilicho, following the previous 
precedent of pulling troops away from border defense to comprise his field army, is at least 
partially responsible for the ease with which the barbarians penetrated Roman frontier defenses. 
With the death of Stilicho in 408, and subsequent desertion of a number of his federate soldiers, 
the remaining Roman forces were incapable of preventing Alaric from sacking Rome. 
To placate these invaders and maintain some semblance of control, Roman emperors 
continuously gave invaders large tracts of land to settle on within the Roman Empire in exchange 
for service as federates. The settlement of Gothic troops in Aquitania is a prime example of this. 
These federates did not pay imperial taxes, which only further strained imperial resources and 
led to a further dependence of federates for military support. The army commanded by Aetius 
consisted largely of federates and after his death this army disappeared, and the West never again 
fielded an effective army of its own. With the financial resources of the West exhausted and no 
army to call on for defense, what remained of the Western Roman Empire fell quietly into the 
night. 
While others have sought to find more narrow explanations for the fall of the Western 
Roman Empire, this study has explained its fall as the result of a slow decline in both the Roman 
military and economy. This explanation is certainly less flashy than Nriagu’s attempt to place 
lead poisoning as the primary cause behind the fall of the empire, but it is vastly more accurate. 
The fall cannot be attributed to the poor and the army as West would have us believe, nor was 
taxation the primary cause as Jones suggests, nor should we examine military factors by 
themselves as Ferrill argues. There simply was no catalyst which can be held up above all others 
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as the primary cause of the Western collapse. This becomes clear only after looking at a broad 
spectrum of issues within both the Roman army and economy.  
The key problems of excessive taxation and the slow decline in quality and effectiveness 
of an overstretched military which contributed to the downfall of the Western Roman Empire, 
are far from unique to one specific case or time. The problem of overextended military resources 
intertwined with economic crisis can be applied to numerous empires throughout history. The 
current situation in the United States falls into this very same pattern. The deployment of large 
numbers of troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq has placed an enormous financial burden on an 
already strained American economy. These two conflicts alone require an estimated $16-billion 
worth of funding every month. The cost of these wars for every household in the United States is 
approximately $100 per month.253 When this is combined with the over $11-trillion worth of 
public debt currently owed by the United States government which over the last several years has 
increased by an average of $3.77 billion per day, the dire state of the American economy 
becomes clear.254 This massive budget deficit cannot continue forever. Unless a solution is found 
quickly, the pressures of an overextended military fighting costly wars, combined with the ever-
increasing national debt, could destroy the United States, just as similar economic and military 
issues brought down the Western Roman Empire. 
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